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I. INTRODUCTION 
One can almost envision Mark S. Mizruchi and Daniel Hirschman 
shaking their heads in puzzlement when they presented a paper at the 
2009 Berle Center Symposium and described the business community as 
having become “incapable of coordinated action to advance its inter-
ests,”1 since it has no specific proposals regarding important contempo-
rary political issues, such as the cost of health insurance and closing the 
deficit.2 Mizruchi and Hirschman expressed confusion as to why busi-
ness leaders, after achieving great political successes in the 1970s and 
1980s in collectively responding to a multitude of mounting pressures, 
became, two decades later, “incapable of generating any form of collec-
tive effort to address not only the larger problems of society, but also to 
even address issues of concern to the corporations themselves.”3 They 
added: 
What these examples represent, then, is a paradox. In the period of 
managerial ascendance in which their power was largely unques-
tioned and untouched, the leaders of the American business com-
munity exhibited a pragmatic, moderate perspective that allowed 
them to support a relatively active state and to accept the legitima-
cy, if not the demands, of labor unions. In the post-managerial peri-
od, in which corporate CEOs no longer enjoy their earlier level of 
autonomy, we have a fragmented, ineffectual business community, 
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one that is seemingly incapable of addressing any of the important 
issues of the day.4 
Ironically, the authors’ own narrative history of the public role of 
top management provides clues for generating an explanation quite ca-
pable of resolving this paradox. A short version of this explanation 
would go as follows: During the half century or so that stretched from 
the ending of the wave of strikes that followed World War I to the oil 
crisis of the 1970s, an era characterized by extraordinary corporate sta-
bility,5 corporate leaders could afford to be pragmatic and moderate. Pre-
cisely because they possessed what Mizruchi and Hirschman label 
“largely unquestioned power,”6 corporate leaders faced little risk of this 
moderation backfiring by exposing weakness, and there were potential 
political, managerial, and economic benefits to accrue from embracing 
moderation. As the seventies progressed, however, they were challenged 
by the forces the two authors themselves list: labor unions, Naderist re-
formers, new competitors, and impatient shareholders.7 The corporate 
elite responded collectively with a harder, more defensive line.8 
The authors’ mistake, however, is in implicitly assuming that, hav-
ing overcome these threats to their personal autonomy, American corpo-
rate leaders went their own ways, essentially unable or unwilling to col-
lectively meet the new challenges that have since arisen. The reality is 
that corporate leaders have continued to respond in a collective manner 
in pursuing both their personal and class interests, but these earlier victo-
ries have both transformed the nature of these interests and altered the 
boundaries of the group that shares these interests. Mizruchi and 
Hirschman’s paradox has disappeared now that their claim “the basis of 
this cohesive corporate community was in the corporation, per se, not as 
Zeitlin argued, in an owning class”9 has simply become obsolete. 
In short, corporate leaders overcame the many difficulties they 
faced in the 1970s by essentially abandoning any serious division be-
tween ownership and control, at least with respect to the relations be-
tween corporate executives and investors on one side and their employ-
ees and the general taxpaying citizenry on the other. Challenged from 
both the left and the right, corporate leaders either survived by assuming 
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the interests of investors or were replaced by those who would. As 
Useem has pointed out, by the end of the 1980s, the view from the ex-
ecutive suite shifted from that of organizations’ leaders to in-house raid-
ers, perpetually looking for ways to cut costs to enhance “shareholder 
value,” the euphemism for the trading price of the company’s stock. 10 
These leaders were not only surviving but also typically thriving by 
adopting investor interests. 
This is not to say that conflict between executives and outside in-
vestors disappeared. It did not, any more than conflict between mafia 
dons, feudal lords, or nobles and rulers disappeared. But executives, the 
independently wealthy, and financial industry insiders who manage other 
people’s money all found common ground in defining sources of wealth 
and the means in which to extract it, even if they inevitably squabbled as 
to the size of individual slices of this wealth and, as is often the case, 
with insiders seeking to find ways to take advantage of outsiders. Notori-
ous examples include Enron, Global Crossing, and Worldcom.11 Corpo-
rate executives continued to pursue their shared class and professional 
interests, much as they had always done, but the exact nature of these 
interests had changed. 
Perhaps Mizruchi and Hirschman missed this explanation because it 
is uncommon for the class interests of an elite group to shift in this man-
ner, although the authors should probably have seen it, given their own 
passing insight that executive concerns for the quality of a national edu-
cational system diminishes if companies can recruit around the globe.12 
Historically, it is far more common for an elite stratum to maintain a set 
of interests even as its membership is altered or even replaced through 
upheaval such as war or coup d’état. Normally, power centers may shift 
geographically, political or economic governance may end up more or 
less centralized, or ground rents may become taxes. But few of these 
changes, even if personally cataclysmic for some of the actors, actually 
shift the fundamental interests of the elites in maintaining the dynamics 
of the social order.13 
Occasionally, however, elite interests and goals do change. Among 
the most significant examples of this rare phenomenon was the commer-
cialization of English agriculture in the early modern period. During that 
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era, the owners of estates increasingly abandoned the nearly universal 
interest of landed oligarchs in keeping or even attracting largely self-
sufficient peasant tenants through one or another mixture of coercion and 
enticement. Due to economic and demographic change, some of which, 
such as the growing demand for wool, were global in scope, English 
landlords increasingly adopted policies of “improvement” to earn reve-
nue, often by enclosing fields and renting to commercially oriented 
farmers and herders, and in the process repudiating many customary 
peasant rights, even physically driving people off their land.14 Similar 
policies would eventually distinguish English settler colonies such as 
those in North America from the colonial practices of those of their 
neighbors. What resulted was a very different set of class relations in the 
English countryside despite much continuity of actual elite membership, 
a continuity that largely survived the civil wars of the seventeenth centu-
ry. Consider this contemporary observation of enclosing from Thomas 
More, as informed and articulate a witness of these events as one could 
hope for: 
[T]here noble men, and gentlemen . . . not contenting themselves 
with the yearly revenues and profits, that were wont to grow to their 
forefathers and predecessors of their lands, nor being content that 
they live in rest and pleasure nothing profiting, . . . leave no ground 
for tillage. They enclose all into pastures, they throw down houses, 
they pluck down towns, and leave nothing standing, . . . the hus-
bandmen be thrust out of their own, or else either by coveyne and 
fraud, or by violent oppression they be put besides it, or by wrongs 
and injuries they be so wearied, that they be compelled to sell 
all . . . . 15 
This example is not meant to idealize or sentimentalize the exploi-
tation of peasants by a multitude of aristocracies down the centuries 
throughout the world. The point here is that given dramatic shifts in po-
litical-economic circumstances, elite interests can change while elite 
membership holds fairly steady, the reverse of typical historical change. 
The former dependence of lords on the peasantry put a floor on how 
poorly the latter could be treated, and respecting their customary rights 
was, at least under some circumstances, more stable and less costly than 
relying on pure coercion, especially when peasants had the means to re-
sist with violence. Once these traditional relationships were no longer as 
profitable as the alternatives, they could, and often were, cast aside (alt-
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hough the process was not necessarily easy) regardless of the conse-
quences for those so cast.16 
Analogizing farm enclosures with the contemporary abandonment 
of corporate responsibilities on the part of business leaders is neither 
farfetched nor strained. Although American labor-management relations 
were hardly idyllic during the first third of the twentieth century, corpo-
rate leaders required a degree of cooperation from their employees, and 
after experiencing the shock of depression and the economic benefits of 
world war, many of these same leaders could see the value in accepting a 
greater degree of government involvement in the economy. For the rulers 
of both English estates and American corporations, practicing a degree of 
noblesse oblige proved to have tangible value, even if often honored in 
the breach. In both cases, however, as the world changed, that payoff 
diminished, or at the very least, the opportunity costs of practicing re-
sponsible behavior rose dramatically. In short, many corporate leaders 
preached, and sometimes practiced, involvement with national problems, 
tolerance of unions, acceptance of some degree of government interfer-
ence in their affairs, and even a willingness to pay higher taxes when it 
appeared, at least to some, in their personal or professional interest to do 
so. Once these institutional arrangements were viewed as shackles or 
burdens that worked to limit or even threaten executive career advance-
ment and financial gain, they were rationally regarded as anathema. 
The question that this presents is what concrete political-economic 
shift propelled this change in attitude. Here Arrighi’s theory of the rise 
and fall of global economic hegemonies can provide an answer.17 Ac-
cording to Arrighi, history features strong precedents of classes of na-
tional entrepreneurs who, having once dominated global trade, find that 
as their commercial dominance erodes, they must increasingly turn to 
extracting wealth from what was accumulated in the financial system as 
their primary source of income.18 To Arrighi, the change in the focus of 
American top management away from production and toward finance 
happened because “it always happens.”19 
Previously, Northern Italian, Dutch, and then English entrepreneurs 
had dominated global trade in turn, and when after a century or so their 
respective hegemonies began to show cracks, each group refocused its 
efforts in the service of tapping already-accumulated wealth through fi-
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1194 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1189 
nancial speculation and, in the process, also financed the rise of their 
successors.20 If Dahrendorf was correct, and American capital was man-
aged during the era of American industrial dominance by “a class of ca-
reer bureaucrats, whose primary loyalty lay with their employer rather 
than with a class of property owners,”21 there are good reasons to believe 
that that has ceased to be the case. “Property owners,” meaning in the 
American case those who control and stand to benefit from financial ac-
tivity (leaving aside the question as to whether shares of corporate stock 
should be defined as “property”), have absorbed these onetime “career 
bureaucrats” into their ranks. And as this subsumption has occurred, cor-
porate executives have had no reason to either identify themselves as a 
distinct political grouping or proactively embrace civic responsibilities 
once thought necessary for maintaining a productive society. 
This Article will cover these issues in five Parts. Part II lays out 
Arrighi’s theory of hegemonic rise and decline in detail. Parts III, IV, 
and V apply Arrighi’s model of a three-stage hegemonic cycle to the as-
sumption, application, and abandonment of corporate social responsibil-
ity on the part of American corporate leaders: first, when the United 
States became the world’s dominant manufacturer; then, in the post-war 
years when it became militarily and politically hegemonic as well, and 
finally, during this last generation, as the hypertrophy of the American 
financial sector masked the nation’s hegemonic decline. Part VI con-
cludes by solving, in more detail, Mizruchi and Hirschman’s paradox. 
II. A WORLD SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON SHIFTING GLOBAL HEGEMONY  
Mizruchi and Hirschman note with apparent disappointment that it 
would be difficult to find an expression of social responsibility, especial-
ly in the financial sector, comparable to the attitude espoused forty years 
ago in this quote from the then-CEO of Bank of America, at the time the 
nation’s largest bank: “[Clausen’s] thoughts turn often to: how to allevi-
ate if not cure the blight now spreading at Hunter’s Point and south of 
Market Street [in San Francisco]; how to crack the city’s hard-core un-
employment; how to cope with student unrest at Berkeley or down the 
peninsula at Stanford.”22 In actuality, the abandonment of this attitude is 
unremarkable since the history of this bank and its relationship to the 
larger society provides almost a perfect exemplar of Arrighi’s model of 
three stages of hegemonic rise and decline. If Arrighi was correct, then 
                                                 
 20. ARRIGHI, supra note 17, at 159–62. 
 21. Mizruchi & Hirschman, supra note 1, at 1078 (discussing RALF DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND 
CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1959)). 
 22. Id. at 1095 (quoting DANIEL BELL, THE COMING POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1973) (quot-
ing John Davenport, Bank of America is Not for Burning, FORTUNE, Jan. 1971)). 
2012] We Don’t Need You Anymore 1195 
the change in attitude was a rational response to a changing political-
economic environment. 
Bank of America’s early years were, to an extent, a model of en-
lightened finance. Founder A. P. Giannini developed a great deal of good 
will for his bank, then one among many in San Francisco, by freely ex-
tending credit after the 1905 earthquake, a policy repeated after the stock 
market crash.23 Then, during and after World War II, the bank grew 
along with California, the primary beneficiary of the new American 
Keynesianism.24 The bank’s technological lead in data processing that 
would later lead to developing the VISA system began with the handling 
of bundled GI checks during the war itself, and the bank grew rapidly by 
investing in its state’s post-war growth, a growth stimulated by aerospace 
and other military expenditures, irrigation, highway construction, and an 
expansive new higher educational system.25 By 1971, at the tail end of 
this era, when American growth still appeared endless, Clausen could not 
only afford to play the statesmen but he also might well have seen doing 
so as in the interest of his bank and his own personal stature. 
By contrast, the seventies and eighties brought an endless stream of 
bad news for Bank of America. This news came in the form of poorly 
performing foreign loans, increased competition, and technological 
breakthroughs that made functions of the traditional branch network ob-
solete, followed by a series of layoffs and speed-ups by this formerly 
highly admired employer.26 The bank eventually survived and prospered, 
but only through a series of mergers and acquisitions in connection with 
NationsBank, including acquiring the fire sale of First Republic and Con-
tinental Illinois assets after the savings and loan scandals that served as 
the starting point of the rolling financial scandal over the last genera-
tion.27 While the bank regained its own prosperity, it did so by commit-
ting most of the well-publicized sins of contemporary corporate Ameri-
ca: moving its headquarters to low-wage North Carolina, involvement in 
any number of financial scams ranging from Enron28 to collateralized 
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mortgage obligations29 and robo-signings,30 and the outsourcing to India 
of both information systems and financial work.31 
These stages all have their counterpart within Arrighi’s model of 
hegemonic rise and decline. Arrighi’s theory begins with Braudel’s ac-
count—itself inspired by a passing comment of Marx32—of the rise and 
fall of leading European metropoles within a globe-spanning network of 
trade and finance.33 Arrighi constructed a causal model upon Braudel’s 
historical narrative, subdividing the history of international capitalism 
since the conquest of the Western Hemisphere into four separate eras or 
“hegemonic waves” dominated by successively larger and more political-
ly coherent core regions, each of which controlled the production and 
trade of the most important goods of its time.34 Every hegemon eventual-
ly discovers that its growing economic dominance not only allows, but 
also even requires it to extend its hegemony into other spheres.35 Of 
course, economic might can buy a great deal of military power and dip-
lomatic influence, but Arrighi follows Gramsci in arguing that global 
hegemony goes beyond compulsion and is based as much on cooperation 
as coercion.36 Not only does the hegemon establish comprador clients 
among local elites, but the very vitality of the hegemonic society also 
proves attractive to other social groups as manifested in their demands 
for its commodities and cultural products, the latter including ideological 
constructs that help legitimize this hegemony. In the case of the United 
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States, one such ideological construct has been corporate social responsi-
bility.37 
One can certainly find Arrighi’s hegemonic pattern in American 
economic history. The United States moved from being primarily an ex-
porter of agricultural commodities as late as the 1870s to becoming the 
world’s leading manufacturer by century’s end, exporting as much as 
Britain while also supplying a much larger domestic market.38 Moreover, 
this growth was concentrated in the high-tech sectors of the day: locomo-
tives, industrial machinery, electrical equipment, typewriters, and farm 
machinery.39 The new large American industrial corporations were not 
only successful in their own right—but they also provided models for the 
rise of new giants in retail and other sectors.40 Internationally, many of 
the new industrial giants, rather than simply selling their wares to whole-
salers abroad, set up subsidiaries for marketing and even educating po-
tential customers.41 
In the early decades of the century, Europeans were quite cognizant 
of the threat posed by the American commercial “menace.” As early as 
the beginning of the new century, Charles Flint, eventually a founder of 
both U.S. Rubber and IBM, reported with a great deal of national pride 
that an editorial in a Hamburg newspaper complained that 
it may be remarked that the typewriting machine with which this ar-
ticle is written, as well as the thousands—nay, hundreds of thou-
sands—of others that are in use throughout the world, was made in 
America, that it stands on an American table, in an office furnished 
with American desks, bookcases and chairs, which cannot be made 
in Europe of equal quality, so practical and convenient, for a similar 
price.42 
A big part of the industrial explosion was the rise of the American 
“Chandlerian” corporation: autonomous, geographically extensive, and 
typically publicly traded after the Great Merger Movement of the late-
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nineteenth century.43 Other nations, notably Britain and Germany, also 
possessed large corporations, although not as many and not in so many 
different industries.44 But what was especially notable was the degree of 
autonomy that American management enjoyed. Firms in other nations 
evolved within the corporatist legacy of absolutism—an institutional plu-
ralism of aristocracies, churches, guilds, military, and others linked to-
gether through networks of patronage.45 One American diplomat actually 
referred to German cartels with some insight as a new form of guild.46 
Even Britain, whose revolutionary seventeenth century had swept away a 
number of institutional constraints on business,47 retained sufficient ties 
to an oligarchical past to experience a Polanyistic48 reaction to the evils 
of industrialization led by such aristocrats as the Seventh Lord Shaftes-
bury, ironically a descendent of an architect of the defeat of British abso-
lutism.49 
In keeping with Arrighi’s model, the rise of the American 
Chandlerian corporation was both a product of the legacy generated by 
the last hegemon and an improvement on it. If the British had superseded 
“the Dutch by internalizing production costs” within the factory,50 and 
the Dutch had previously eclipsed the Italian cities by “internalizing pro-
duction costs” instead of relying on Hapsburg armies,51 then the Ameri-
can corporation trumped Britain by “internalizing transaction costs” 
within the continent-spanning corporation.52 This change occurred, how-
ever, not without the massive assistance of its predecessor. Naturally, as 
a former colony, the United States inherited a great deal of the mother 
country’s political-economic legacy, ranging from textile factories, to the 
clearing of land of its inhabitants for commercial exploitation, to the cor-
porate charter itself,53 just as Dutch trading networks and support for the 
                                                 
 43. ARRIGHI, supra note 17, at 239–42; CHANDLER, supra note 40, at 3–4; WILLIAM G. ROY, 
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(1995). 
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Glorious Revolution facilitated the rise of British capitalism.54 More spe-
cifically, however, as much as Dutch investment helped spur the English 
agricultural revolution,55 Britain stimulated the emergence of the large 
American corporation by buying the bonds that built the American rail-
roads.56 These railroads not only provided the physical means to make 
continental-wide manufacturing and sales possible but they also brought 
financial, managerial, and technological innovations that strongly influ-
enced the development of industrial corporations and insatiably con-
sumed inputs, generating a great deal of the initial demand for the output 
of the industrial sector.57 
Once industrial dominance was established, the United States 
achieved the second stage of a fuller, more mature hegemony by the end 
of World War II. Between the fall of Berlin and the fall of Saigon, Amer-
ican hegemony within the capitalist world system spread well beyond 
mere commercial triumph.58 Conventions and institutions such as Bren-
ton Woods, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the United Nations (established in 
New York as a result of a donation from, appropriately enough, the se-
cond John Rockefeller), plus America’s network of military bases 
abroad, the permanent war economy at home and its interference in the 
politics of distant lands59 (a process in which the namesake of this very 
symposium was a major player), collectively represented a radically dif-
ferent role for a nation that had previously maintained only small peace-
time armies, was a minor participant in the nineteenth-century rush for 
colonies, entered World War I only in its third year, refused to join the 
League of Nations, and regarded isolationism as a legitimate political 
position. American cultural and intellectual influence also spread during 
the course of the century,60 if less abruptly, and these were often the un-
intended product of the European wars, as European countries absorbed 
huge quantities of American goods and sent over waves of refugees in 
return.61 
Finally, however, the American hegemon began to lose its compar-
ative advantages. Europe and East Asia, recovering from thirty years of 
                                                 
 54. Id. at 246. 
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disaster that were themselves the product of a spreading industrialization, 
could, to a very large extent, imitate American success while adding their 
own comparative advantages under changing circumstances, advantages 
that varied from place to place—lower labor costs, newer plants, fewer 
diversions of resources into the military, greater reliance on family-based 
networking, welfare-state social contracts, and lifetime employment.62 
American manufacturing dominance was eroding from a variety of direc-
tions, and services would not make up the difference because, for the 
most part, the kinds of services that could readily be traded across bor-
ders were even easier to imitate than manufacturing.63 
On the other hand, the United States had accumulated a great deal 
of paper wealth, much of it stored in the pensions and mutual funds of 
workers or backed by either the security of American governments or the 
supposedly irreversible desirability of American urban and suburban real 
estate.64  Eventually, tapping and leveraging this wealth became more 
reliably profitable than the uncertainty of competing in international 
product markets.65 At the same time, those who continued to compete in 
product markets, often because they had no choice, attempted to reduce 
costs, especially labor costs, through a variety of means like union bust-
ing, layoffs, speed-ups, and of course, outsourcing, both by contracting 
abroad and setting up manufacturing elsewhere for reimporting as well as 
sales abroad.66 
This last step in the process may have triggered another Arrighian 
wave. As manufacturing has moved abroad, not only has the industrial 
capacity of other nations become more sophisticated over time but the 
work of engineering, designing, and programming has also increasingly 
followed to one degree or another occupations that defenders of out-
sourcing had argued would stay in the United States (especially to South 
China).67 While much of this offshore activity still benefits ostensibly 
“American” firms, it is not clear how this profitability benefits the great 
majority of Americans who have little stake in the stock market.68 Fur-
thermore, to the extent these global profits are not repatriated, they too 
are invested abroad, and while marketing and branding continue to allow 
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some American companies to profit from globalization, it is not obvious 
that these advantages are any more sustainable than they were for IBM 
when, under its own logo, it sold personal computers that were simply 
assemblages of parts produced by other firms. 
To justify this change in economic relations, a new ideology of 
“shareholder value” emerged, something of a replay of the triumph of the 
“City”69 in late-nineteenth-century Britain. The triumph of finance is per-
fectly exemplified by the oncologist who left one of the most desirable 
posts in his field at Harvard Medical School in order to pick health care 
stocks for a financial firm,70 or the Secretary of Labor who when con-
fronted with the reality of weak job creation responded by pointing to a 
recovering stock market, reminding the journalist that “[t]he stock mar-
ket is, after all, the final arbiter.”71 
The point of this excursion in American-twentieth-century econom-
ic history is to lay the groundwork for explaining the twists and turns 
over time of executives’ perceptions and acknowledgement of their cor-
porate responsibilities. As I discuss in the following Parts, the executives 
of an industrializing pre-Depression America focused on labor relations 
as the locus of their responsibilities. As the scope of American hegemony 
broadened after World War II, so too did views on corporate responsi-
bilities, reflecting the supposedly nonideological pluralism of elite per-
spectives on American society. As pluralism died in the eighties, and 
executives felt besieged by both activists and investors, formulations on 
corporate responsibilities retreated to vague banalities to be defined by 
management itself, whose primary functions were public relations and, 
perhaps, a justification in the face of shareholder complaints. 
III. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THE LABOR PEACE 
Perhaps the distinguishing feature of the American large corpora-
tion as it emerged in the late-nineteenth century was the relatively high 
levels of autonomy it granted management from the demands of credi-
tors,72 government regulators, cartels, and of course, labor unions. What-
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ever the union tactics—the industrial approach of the ARU73 or the estab-
lished craft unions of the AFL, 74  the cooperative philosophy of the 
Knights of Labor75 or the radicalism of the IWW76—time and again the 
new corporate giants thwarted and even reversed organized labor’s ef-
forts to gain a foothold.77 
Part of this success in thwarting organized labor can be attributed to 
state power intervening on the side of management in the form of court 
orders and the associated deployment of state force.78 Despite a common 
law right to strike, courts consistently found grounds to restrict it, espe-
cially where large concerns were involved, undermining the right by ap-
plying doctrines such as conspiracy, intimidation, restraint of trade, and 
intentional infliction of economic distress.79 This practice was taken to 
the extreme with Chief Justice Taft’s infamous decision to ignore the 
plainly worded exemption of labor unions from the Clayton Act.80 As for 
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violence against strikers, an entire library of literature covers state vio-
lence against strikers by police, national guard and federal troops,81 state-
sanctioned violence on the part of deputized Pinkertons, 82  and even 
unprosecuted private violence as practiced by Ludlow guards,83 Harry 
Bennett at Ford,84 or the Black Legions of Michigan.85 The sum total of 
this deadly force through the depression years, employed overwhelming-
ly on the side of management, led a presidential commission to label the 
United States as the possessor of the bloodiest labor history of any na-
tion.86 
This violence itself was the product of the second Industrial Revo-
lution in the United States, concentrated as it was among railroads, min-
ing, heavy industry, and the occasional large textile mill.87 Before the 
Great Railroad Strike of 1877, labor relations in the United States had 
been largely free of deadly violence,88 and strikes against smaller enter-
prises continued thereafter at the relatively smaller rate of a few thousand 
a year with relatively little state interference, resulting, according to gov-
ernment statistics, with either success for the workers or compromise 
most of the time.89 Perhaps the far lower success rate and the greater 
likelihood of deadly force at the larger enterprises was due to the sheer 
mass of employees involved, which generated more fear among the pub-
lic, or alternatively, the managers of these concerns had more political 
pull, able to appeal to the governor if the local officials were recalcitrant, 
or the nearest federal garrison or even the president, should the governor 
prove unsympathetic.90 Correspondingly, the strikers themselves, often 
immigrant groups,91 might have engendered less sympathy from both the 
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general public and public officials than the established, often indispensa-
ble, craftsmen who tended to engage in smaller-scale actions.92 Perhaps 
John Rockefeller was at least partially correct in arguing, after his own 
embarrassment at Ludlow, that the very size of the new enterprises had 
destroyed the personal connections that had kept things from getting out 
of hand in the past.93 
Repression was by no means entirely the cause of the defeat of or-
ganized labor. In Germany and Britain, workers were able to take ad-
vantage of centralized, parliamentary government to organize political-
ly,94 and if they were not entirely able to capture the state, they could at 
least exert sufficient political pressure to prevent the kind of judicial de-
cisions and state actions that so bedeviled their American counterparts.95 
German guilds, well-established in corporatist preindustrial Germany, 
were even able to parlay their strong social position into organizing the 
new factories with ultimately a great deal of success in unionizing heavy 
industry.96 By contrast, the American decentralized federal system was a 
far more difficult polity to capture, especially since crucial parts of it (the 
Senate and judiciary) were not structurally democratic. Moreover, labor 
organizing was undermined from the start by racial, ethnic, and regional 
differences that tended to be more extreme than elsewhere.97 Catholic 
and Jewish labor leaders found it difficult to cooperate with evangelistic 
populists who, though they may have shared the complaints of organized 
labor regarding the growing power of corporations, were as Samuel 
Gompers himself noted, often employers themselves and not necessarily 
good ones at that.98 
Moreover, the kind of labor organizing that survived, typically 
among the skilled crafts industry that remained an essential part of the 
American economy, were simply not equipped to deal with what oppor-
tunities arose in the new organizations. John Patterson of National Cash 
Register and Gerard Swope of General Electric, perhaps the two most 
famous welfare capitalists of the early-twentieth century, both invited 
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unions to organize their workers, opportunities that the unions them-
selves squandered.99 Perhaps understandably, Gompers, after two dec-
ades spent hobnobbing with the corporate elite at the National Civic Fed-
eration,100 gave up on confrontation and was reduced to quixotic pleading 
for cooperation, 101  clinging to memories of the short-lived labor-
management detente struck during World War I, a detente driven by the 
spike in government funding and demands for labor peace. 
Corporate triumph over their own workers was not simply a matter 
of defeating organized labor or even preventing the formation of a mass 
labor party exerting political pressure to regulate the workplace. Em-
ployment-at-will evolved to a near absolute state as a result of court cas-
es instigated, but lost, by the new white collar workers filling occupa-
tions that were themselves generated by the new corporate bureaucra-
cies.102 White collar or blue, by the early years of the twentieth century, 
corporate management had established their right to treat their employees 
basically as they wished. 
Criticism and suspicion of how the new firms were using this free-
dom did not simply originate from labor leaders and liberal reformers. 
The very same judge who was active in the indictment of a number of 
Pullman103 strikers104 wrote in a national magazine that the new corporate 
bureaucracies were undermining supposedly “republican” values of in-
dependence and entrepreneurship, 105  a charge echoed elsewhere by a 
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number of other establishment figures who were concerned that these 
radically new forms of business organizations violated the tradition of 
the independent American.106 Furthermore, even conservative establish-
ment figures of the time acknowledged the need for some form of union 
organization to bargain on behalf of employees.107 Those cautiously sup-
portive of the idea of collective bargaining included Richard Olney,108 
the U.S. Attorney General who called out the Army and prosecuted the 
Pullman strikers,109 and two of the nation’s most prominent economists, 
Arthur Hadley, a conservative President of Yale, 110  and John Bates 
Clark,111 a pioneer of marginalism, a doctrine often employed to justify 
the status quo of compensation. Even William Howard Taft, in the same 
decision that ignored congressional intent in barring application of the 
Clayton Act to labor unions,112 could acknowledge the following, in an 
astonishing exercise of cognitive dissonance: 
[Unions] were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A 
single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He 
was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance 
of himself and family. If the employer refused to pay him the 
wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave 
the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union 
was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality 
with their employer. They united to exert influence upon him 
and to leave him in a body in order by this inconvenience to in-
duce him to make better terms with them. They were withhold-
ing their labor of economic value to make him pay what they 
thought it was worth. The right to combine for such a lawful 
purpose has in many years not been denied by any court. The 
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strike became a lawful instrument in a lawful economic struggle 
or competition between employer and employees as to the share 
or division between them of the joint product of labor and capi-
tal.113 
With very few exceptions, Swope being the most notable, top man-
agement would have none of this union tolerance.114 If anyone was going 
to look after the interests of employees, it was going to be the new en-
lightened managers who understood that they would be held responsible 
for what occurred in their workplaces, not only by workers but also by 
investors and an educated public quite willing to openly acknowledge the 
potential for class conflict in mistreating employees.115 The rapaciously 
and counterproductively shortsighted owner-operators such as George 
Pullman, whom even Marc Hanna called a “damned idiot” in public for 
refusing to compromise,116 could not meet the challenge of a disgruntled 
working class, the pressures of competitive markets, or the skepticism of 
the public concerning their policies. Much as an occupying army must 
find a way to run the nation it has overrun, management was under pres-
sure to organize their employees and workplaces in a manner that would 
not only prove efficient and relatively free of disruptive conflict but also 
be acceptable to larger society.117 
Workers were largely prevented from organizing and striking, but 
they could not be prevented from doing individual acts of sabotage, 
slacking off, or simply walking away.118 At the same time, massive rates 
of turnover were ironically becoming a larger, more expensive problem 
for corporations, as company-trained semi-skilled workers and job spe-
cific knowledge became increasingly important.119 Scholars subsequently 
conducted a number of studies analyzing these serious social and eco-
nomic concerns.120 Observing the apparent end of the struggle with orga-
nized labor in a 1928 Harvard lecture, future NLRB commissioner Wil-
liam Leiserson argued that while corporations had largely solved the 
“Large L” labor question in an enlightened matter, a number of “small l” 
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labor problems connected with morale and efficiency remained for man-
agement to solve.121 Moreover, as Florence Kelley, the founder of the 
National Consumers League,122 insisted, the important political issue of 
the quality and safety of the consumables and clothing generated by the 
new corporate giants was actually intertwined with the issues arising 
from who actually made or handled them and under what conditions.123 
A variety of personnel policies and “welfare plans” were proposed 
and implemented as solutions to these workplace-related issues.124 Effi-
ciently organized workplaces were one solution—optimally, they would 
be free of the petty and arbitrary tyranny of foremen and would produce 
enough to cover incentive pay.125 Job ladders were reframed as offering 
opportunities for safe and modern entrepreneurship rather than simply 
steps that led only deeper into a stifling, inhuman bureaucracy.126 Corpo-
rate promoter James Dill127 even had the temerity to suggest that if the 
large corporation was destroying opportunities for small business 
startups, then these would-be entrepreneurs would be well-advised to 
invest their capital in an increasingly safe stock market.128 Welfare pro-
grams as a solution were thought to not only please employees and alle-
viate concerns of the public at large but, if focused on health and nutri-
tion, also produce more efficient workers as well.129 
As the president of Studebaker Motors put it, it is “the duty of capi-
tal and management to compensate labor liberally, paying at least the 
current wage and probably a little bit more, and give workers healthful 
surroundings and treat them with the utmost consideration.”130 Forbes 
Magazine put the same argument negatively, warning that “[g]iven [em-
ployees’] power to help or hinder a firm, the employer who does not do 
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everything in his power to satisfy his men is not only short-si[gh]ted 
from his point of view but is an enemy of national peace and harmo-
ny.”131 
Furthermore, a strong reputation as an employer could help allay 
public concerns about other aspects of a business. The halo from 
NCR’s132 reputation as an employer helped the company win broad pub-
lic support in its battle against price fixing,133 a tactic of deflection con-
sciously imitated by public relations pioneer Ivy Lee on behalf of the 
legally troubled International Harvester,134 a company considerably less 
benign in its treatment of employees.135 Deliberately or not, Hershey’s 
and Heinz also followed Florence Kelley’s advice and used their own 
corporate welfare programs as evidence of the wholesomeness of their 
food products.136 
The issue here, however, is not the sincerity or even the effective-
ness of these efforts at workplace reform. Understanding the develop-
ment of the construct of corporate social responsibility is not dependent 
on whether U.S. Steel’s Elbert Gary, who fought his own board of direc-
tors to preserve a subsidized stock purchase plan for his workers,137 was 
genuinely helping his employees who were more interested in higher 
wages and shorter shifts than in buying stock.138 
What is significant is that during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century, top management of the new American corporate giants, such as 
Gary, began to shift their self-presentation from a somewhat defensive 
stance along the lines of “I am a good employer,” to a more proactive 
one of trying to be a good citizen, mindful of the interests of a variety of 
stakeholders and cognizant of the welfare of the society as a whole. Ow-
en Young, General Electric’s Chair, Swope’s boss, and a friend of Louis 
Brandeis,139 told a Harvard audience: 
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We think of managers no longer as the partisan attorneys of either 
group [capital or labor] against the other. Rather we have come to 
consider them as trustees of the whole undertaking, whose respon-
sibility is to see to it on the one side that the invested capital is safe 
and that its return is adequate and continuous; and on the other side 
that competent and conscientious men are found to do the work and 
that their job is safe and their earnings are adequate and continu-
ous.140 
The liberal Gerard Swope, who had once tutored at Hull House and 
whose wife was a close friend of Florence Kelley’s, explicitly put the 
public interest and his employees ahead of the interest of stockholders,141 
but even the reactionary Liberty Leaguer Alfred Sloan acknowledged in 
his memoirs that “[t]hose charged with great industrial responsibility 
must become industrial statesmen.”142 
Before the Depression changed everything, corporate leaders, fully 
aware of the extraordinary autonomy they enjoyed with regard to how 
they ran “their” companies, did their best to present themselves as fully 
worthy of the public’s trust, although even sympathetic observers were 
not necessarily convinced that what they heard was necessarily more 
than public relations or self-congratulations.143 Writing in his own maga-
zine, B. C. Forbes noted with some frustration that conditions in a large 
number of businesses still “tend to breed socialists, communists, and oth-
er unwholesome agitators,” 144  while the Dean of Harvard Business 
School complained that “[w]ords about service too often are a smug cov-
er for the desire to be left alone.”145 
Nonetheless, there appears to have been a realization that there 
were limits to how poorly employees could be treated, and no doubt 
some executives genuinely wished to share the company’s successes 
with their workers and look after their welfare, though, with very few 
exceptions, always on their own terms and virtually never voluntarily 
limiting their own autonomy by recognizing unions or tolerating intru-
sive regulation.146 At the same time, business leaders needed to convince 
a skeptical public across classes of the new form of business organization 
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that it was not undermining the American value of independence, itself a 
reaction to old world dependencies. Before this public relations offensive 
had time to build much momentum, the Depression arrived, diminishing 
the significance of the public musings of corporate executives with re-
gard to their own voluntarily assumed responsibilities. 
IV. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER MATURE HEGEMONY 
During the two decades of turmoil that began with the stock market 
crash and ended with such stabilizing institutions as the establishment of 
NATO147 and the “Treaty of Detroit,”148 corporate leaders’ self-definition 
of their responsibilities were eclipsed by both a federal government that 
regulated and spent to an unprecedented degree and a resurgent labor 
movement that finally posed a genuine threat to the autonomy of corpo-
rate management. As a new social equilibrium was reached, questions of 
corporate social responsibilities resumed, but the focus shifted to some 
degree away from what responsibilities executives were willing to as-
sume to what society at large had the right to expect. 
This stance kept with the transitory pluralism of the post-war gen-
eration.149 As Mizruchi and Hirschman themselves point out,150 after the 
Depression, much of the corporate world acknowledged the need for a 
degree of fiscal management by government, 151  appreciated the new 
higher levels of government expenditures on infrastructure and de-
fense,152 and even to a degree, accepted unionization or at least under-
stood the need to match union gains elsewhere.153 While corporate ex-
ecutives continued to offer their proverbial “two cents” on the issue of 
corporate responsibilities—Standard Oil Chair Frank Abrams’s Harvard 
Business Review piece on the topic154 was widely noted at the time155—
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the setting for this discourse became increasingly academic, driven to a 
degree by the explosive growth in business schools after World War II.156 
The new unionization, and its relationship with corporate manage-
ment, actually played a central role in post-war formulation of corporate 
responsibility. While other issues were incorporated, the relationship of 
the corporation to its employees never budged from the center of discus-
sions of corporate responsibilities, beginning with Depression-era ex-
changes between Berle and Dodd that put the issue on the academic 
map.157 These two law professors disagreed over many issues, but the 
authors were in general agreement with regard to the centrality of the 
treatment of employees. According to Dodd: “There is a widespread and 
growing feeling that industry owes to its employees, not merely the nega-
tive duties of refraining from overworking or injuring them, but the af-
firmative duty of providing them so far as possible with economic securi-
ty.”158 Berle and Means essentially echoed Dodd’s sentiments in their 
short list of social obligations that a court would and should uphold 
against shareholder opposition, giving priority to employee interests: 
“fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, 
and stabilization of business.” 159 
For the new academic cohort of corporate social responsibility for-
mulators, the onus for protecting society’s interests would be dependent 
less on the goodwill or enlightened self-interest of management and more 
on the countervailing power of the new industrial unions, whose success 
in carrying out this mission would not only boost the welfare of their 
immediate members but also assist business. 160  On the macro level, 
widespread collective bargaining would lead to rent sharing and prevent 
the kind of under-consumption that many felt had bedeviled the Ameri-
                                                 
 156. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 233–35 (2007). 
 157. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932) (“The present writer is thoroughly in sympathy with Mr. Berle’s 
efforts to establish a legal control which will more effectually prevent corporate managers from 
diverting profit into their own pockets from those of shareholders, and agrees with many of the spe-
cific rules the latter deduces from his trusteeship principle. He nevertheless believes that it is unde-
sirable, even with the laudable purpose of giving stockholders much-needed protection against self-
seeking managers, to give increased emphasis at the present time to the view that business corpora-
tions exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their shareholders.”). 
 158. Id. at 1151. 
 159. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 312 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.  rev. ed. 1968) (1932). 
 160. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF 
COUNTERVAILING POWER 113–17 (rev. ed. 1956). 
2012] We Don’t Need You Anymore 1213 
can economy before and during the Depression,161 and on the micro lev-
el, union recognition would allow labor to cooperate with management 
for the sake of shared efficiency gains and financial success.162 
The central place of labor-management cooperation in the devel-
opment of post-war concepts of corporate responsibility was exemplified 
by the first book-length discussion of the topic, Howard Bowen’s Social 
Responsibility of the Businessman.163 The worldly Bowen, an economist 
who had worked for Congress and had become a university administra-
tor,164 acknowledged that “[t]he idea that there should be broader partici-
pation in business decisions—that businessmen should share their pow-
ers with other groups—has frequently been expressed over the past fifty 
years.”165 In support of this claim, Bowen cited (among others) John 
Maynard Keynes, Peter Drucker, James Lincoln, Ordway Tead, Morris 
Cooke, J. M. Clark and Sumner Slichter, Neil Chamberlain, and a 
“steelworkers’ trilogy” of union officials: Philip Murray, Clinton Golden, 
and Harold Ruttenberg.166 Keynes, Drucker, and Lincoln are well-known 
for advocating, respectively, government demand management,167 “cor-
poratist” corporate relationships,168 and gainsharing.169 Cooke and Tead 
were pro-labor Taylorists170 who had discovered through consulting that 
unions tended to be more interested in improving workplace practices 
than a large segment of the managers they had dealt with.171 Tead co-
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authored a Depression-era personnel textbook that quoted John Stuart 
Mills approvingly on the need for worker self-protection,172 and would 
publish, as an editor at Harper Brothers, many of the corporate social 
responsibility books of the fifties and sixties.173 Cooke was a theorist of 
labor-management cooperation who gained the confidence of Sidney 
Hillman,174 who as president of the Textile Workers Union, put many of 
his ideas into practice between the wars, albeit at smaller firms than the 
corporate giants that dominated the American economy.175 Cooke was 
later involved with the steelworker officials, even “co-writing” a book on 
labor management with United Steelworkers’ President Murray.176 Gold-
en, who was labeled by the Saturday Evening Post “labor’s ambassador 
to business,”177 was a patron of Joseph Scanlon whose own gainsharing 
plan became an inspiration for Douglas McGregor’s Theory Y.178 Golden 
and Ruttenberg wrote their own well-received book on labor-
management cooperation,179 which Ruttenberg used as a career spring-
board, making him possibly the only union staffer in American history to 
eventually become a corporate vice-president.180 Clark and Slichter were 
successful mainstream economists, both one-time presidents of the 
AEA.181 Clark shared his father’s (John Bates Clark) appreciation of the 
economic role of labor unions, even writing that “[h]igh wages are good 
for business; probably higher wages than business as a whole would pay 
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without some pressure of the sort unions exert. Therefore unions have 
almost certainly been good for business.”182 Slichter, while often critical 
of unions in his work, acknowledged their positive roles in enhancing 
intrafirm communications and providing justice for the rank-and-file.183 
Neil Chamberlain, a young industrial relations academic, provided 
the transition from the relatively narrow academic study of unions to 
broader concerns over the optimum relationship between the corporation 
and the larger society in his post-war book The Union Challenge to 
Management Control.184 There, he stated that the labor-management rela-
tionship was “highly charged with an ethical content. Judgments are re-
quired as to the moral validity of legal relationships, the justification for 
economic powers and distributive shares [and]the philosophical founda-
tions for political arrangements.”185 
Not surprisingly then, the academics who pursued the topic were 
trained in either industrial relations186 or macroeconomics.187 Selekman, 
the figure from this post-war cohort of scholars who wrote most exten-
sively on the subject of business ethics and responsibilities, actually be-
gan his research career working with social reformer Mary Van Kleeck, 
writing a critical study of Colorado Fuel’s representation plan established 
in the aftermath of the Ludlow disaster.188 
The content of this literature varied, but it ultimately converged on 
the point that what the United States required was an institutional bal-
ance between various organized interest groups—businesses, unions, 
schools, churches, agriculture—refereed by an overseeing but light-of-
touch government on behalf of the general public whose independence 
ought to be respected by all participants. This arrangement would not 
only ensure continued and broad-based prosperity but would also provide 
the American answer to communism and social democracy’s challenge 
to American hegemony. Bowen, who understood something about ex-
ploiting the fear of communism from having once been red-baited out of 
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a dean’s position for his Keynesian views,189 expressed the common sen-
timent in his book that “it is becoming increasingly obvious that a free-
dom of choice and delegation of power such as businessmen exercise 
would hardly be permitted to continue without some assumption of social 
responsibility.”190 Selekman was even more explicit, noting that it would 
be “one of the tragic ironies of history if management itself . . . actually 
perpetrated that divisiveness which Karl Marx predicted . . . would soon 
incite the proletariat to overthrow their ‘capitalist masters.’” 191  Even 
Selekman’s Harvard Business School colleague Theodore Levitt, a critic 
of imposing social responsibilities upon management, conceded that 
“[f]ew people will man the barricades against capitalism if it is a good 
provider, minds its own business, and supports government in the things 
which are properly government’s.”192 
This was a worldly group, with backgrounds beyond economics, 
including government, nonprofits, and administration, and they generally 
expressed contempt for either the pretensions of a self-regulating laissez-
faire, or a dependence on the enlightened wisdom of an autonomous 
managerial stratum. Selekman, perhaps benefitting from his experience 
with Rockefeller’s efforts after Ludlow, found such dependency absurd, 
observing that “[i]t is much easier to dispense justice, to be benevolent, 
than it is to share power—especially with those who have the means to 
compel such sharing.”193 Kaysen expressed these sentiments even more 
strongly: 
But what management takes into account is what management de-
cides to take into account, and however responsible management 
policy is, . . . it is responsible only in terms of the goals, values, and 
knowledge of management. No direct responsibility, made effective 
by formal and functioning machinery of control, exists. No matter 
how responsible managers strive to be, they remain in the funda-
mental sense irresponsible oligarchs in the context of the modern 
corporate system.194 
Finally, Dale, as a European refugee who understood the dangers of 
tyranny, warned: 
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Is it desirable . . . that managers be given the broad social responsi-
bility for allocating resources among the various interest groups? 
. . . . 
 If managers really begin to function in this way, all the various 
parties at interest, and the general public, may well begin to ask for 
a voice in selecting them. It is contrary to all democratic tradition 
for constituents to have no say in the selection of their representa-
tives and no way of calling them to account.195 
What might seem most remarkable to contemporary eyes is not so 
much what these individuals wrote but how they were received. While 
not uncritically accepted,196 this perspective, which would be labeled to-
day as “ultra-liberal,” earned a polite and sometimes enthusiastic recep-
tion among the corporate elite. Bowen’s book—in which he made such 
assertions as: “The prevalence of the laissez-faire doctrine . . . has creat-
ed in some quarters the illusion that any revival of social controls is un-
necessary and moral principles may have only limited application in eco-
nomic life”;197 “the distribution of property and power [was] diffused 
widely”198 by limiting large incomes “to what is justified by . . . need, 
incentive, and capital formation”;199 and “[p]rices, wages, and profits 
should be determined with considerations of justice paramount”200—
earned a much more positive review from a corporate executive in the 
pages of Management Review than it did from the left-leaning The Na-
tion.201 For the post-war generation of executives who had experienced 
first-hand the traumas of the previous generation, surrendering a degree 
of autonomy in return for labor peace, a stable and prosperous economy, 
the security of government appropriations, and protection from a serious 
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antibusiness threat from abroad did not necessarily seem like an unrea-
sonable deal. This entente, however, was about to run its course. 
V. THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND THE END OF 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
As Mizruchi and Hirschman themselves chronicle,202 along with a 
number of other commentators,203 the 1970s and early 1980s were a dis-
aster for established American manufacturing for a number of reasons: 
inflation followed by high interest rates and a strong dollar, a productivi-
ty slowdown, and increased competition, both domestic and internation-
al, often by companies with lower labor costs.204 Furthermore, raiders 
and shareholder activists, breaking with the long-time toleration of “sep-
aration of ownership and control” when it generally served the shared 
class interests of investors,205 were increasingly dissatisfied with the ar-
rangement in an age of increasingly uncompetitive firms and high-paying 
alternative investments in the bond market. Justified by finance academ-
ics, they began to exert their well-documented pressure on management, 
which led to the historic compromise of stock option compensation. 
Historically and legally, agency theory was not an accurate account 
of how corporations were expected to be run. Incorporation in general, 
and limited liability specifically, were never sold to the voting public as 
intended exclusively for the benefit of investors.206 Nor had courts ever 
imposed such a single-minded duty on the managers of publicly traded 
firms.207 But it was an idea whose time had arrived, a time when the 
United States could no longer count on industrial hegemony to generate a 
broadly shared prosperity that could more or less satisfy a variety of 
stakeholders. Jensen, the most famous of the agency theorists, was quite 
candid at the disruption that would result from imposing shareholder 
primacy, noting that it would generate a “crisis atmosphere [where] man-
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agers [were] require[d] to slash unsound investment programs, shrink 
overhead, and dispose of assets.”208 Nor did he pretend that once the 
smoke cleared the entire society would benefit, and actually promoted a 
situation in which “real wages are likely to continue their sluggish 
growth and some will fall dramatically over the coming two or three dec-
ades, perhaps as much as 50% in some sectors.”209 What Jensen was sug-
gesting then was that it was high time for investors to look out exclusive-
ly for their own interests and reward only those executives who would 
serve these. 
The shareholder revolution, however, was only the tip of the ice-
berg. In a situation where the future appeared so uncertain, and academic 
theory emerged to argue that the stock market was the most reliable 
guide to understanding it, cost-cutting to please Wall Street and maxim-
izing one’s income in the process was easy for top management to ra-
tionalize as economically sound as well as self-aggrandizing. It did not 
take much to convince top management to organize against union politi-
cal initiatives because unions were blamed, and with some reason, for 
contributing to inflation and blocking reforms meant to increase work-
place efficiency.210 But even after suffering defeat after defeat, many un-
ions offered a new cooperative relationship, much as they had during the 
1920s rollbacks,211 but these were generally rejected or repudiated.212 
Moreover, the decline in the power and membership of organized labor 
was accompanied by a rolling wave of outsourcing and downsizing, 
starting with line workers and middle management,213 and extending to 
white collar and even professional work.214 Even when freed of union 
power, management tried to free itself from dependency on individual 
American workers who were not only expensive by world standards, but 
were also, as one management consultant remarked to this author, “walk-
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ing lawsuits,” as the rights of individual employees had expanded in the 
wake of the civil rights movement. 
Meanwhile, following this pattern of reducing costs while increas-
ing revenues, government was reshaped to accomplish these ends, espe-
cially at the federal level. An often-told story of executive mobilization 
sparked by the “Powell letter” of 1971 to the Chamber of Commerce,215 
and organized by such business leaders as Donald Kendall,216 proved 
quite effective. Whatever resistance the Democratic Party and the liberal 
wing of the Republicans might have offered were largely quashed by the 
election of 1980 and the rethinking of the Democratic Caucus under To-
ny Coelho’s leadership.217 From then on, regardless of the specific out-
come of elections, taxes would be kept low or even rolled-back—
primarily those that affected businesses and upper-bracket incomes—
“expensive” regulation would be reduced or avoided, especially in the 
financial sector, and subsidies to corporations through the Department of 
Defense and various health-related programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and 
National Institute of Health) would actually increase. States, competing 
with one another for increasingly scarce well-paying jobs and with poli-
ticians for the inducements of money instead of their federal counter-
parts, generally followed suit by limiting or reducing taxes while also 
introducing and strengthening a plethora of economic development pro-
grams and tax benefits that were rarely audited for effectiveness.218 
Ideology was fashioned to justify these shifts. Money was spent on 
a variety of think tanks and university centers,219 exemplified by the once 
mildly Keynesian Committee for Economic Development turning sharp-
ly against regulation.220 One CEO warned universities in the pages of the 
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Harvard Business Review that from now on it would be “Corporate Sup-
port of Education: Some Strings Attached,”221 with the author finding 
that even Galbraith, the most famous of the corporate pluralists, who had 
been attacked at one time by Sweezy for his failure to grasp the class 
conflict,222 was too far left to be taught without “balance” in the curricu-
lum.223 Money, however, was not always necessary to induce the proper 
intellectual ammunition. Not long after the Red Scare, Selekman could 
still publish with his wife a book titled Power and Morality in a Business 
Society224 with little controversy.225 By the seventies, two highly respect-
ed economists could write with bold-face audacity that power was not 
even an issue within the modern corporations because the business firm 
“has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in 
the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two 
people”226 and, in doing so, produce one of the most cited economic arti-
cles of the era. 
In a similar Orwellian reversal of reality, the construct of corporate 
social responsibility survived and even thrived, but in a form that was 
little more than an empty slogan. Discussions of corporate responsibili-
ties continued through the sixties and seventies, though tellingly, Bowen 
had already given up hope a generation after his seminal book was pub-
lished.227 The second cohort of academics who participated in this dis-
course—like Davis, Epstein, Frederick, Mahan, Post, and Preston228—
lacked the stature or knowledge of their Ivy League predecessors and 
were always regarded by some of their business school colleagues as be-
ing “anti-business.” In the eighties, the discussion of corporate responsi-
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bilities was revived as the new subfield of business ethics established a 
place for itself in business schools as a kind of chaplaincy.229 
The new field deliberately established itself as an alternative to the 
shareholder-primacy view by arguing that managements should use their 
legal and organizational discretion not to ignore shareholders but rather 
to also consider the interests of other “stakeholders” (the near-pun was 
deliberate),230 honor implicit “social contracts,”231 or practice personal 
virtues.232 Explicitly reproducing the advice offered by Kant, Locke, and 
Aristotle to elite rulers—Frederick the Great, the English landed gentry, 
and the voting citizens of Athens, respectively—the new version of cor-
porate social responsibility was in many respects a throwback to the 
“wise executive” version of the 1920s. But this throwback was even va-
guer, paying less attention to the realities of American employees, 
though the victims of sweat shops in distant barbarous lands did receive 
an occasional mention.233 Tellingly, John Rawls is the most frequently 
cited contemporary philosopher within this literature, though it is largely 
for his “veil of ignorance.”234 His “difference principle”235 from the same 
work is virtually never mentioned, although its contemporary relevance 
to an ethical examination of income inequality would seemingly be be-
yond question. An indication of the innocuousness of the new literature 
is that even Michael Jensen, as strong an advocate for shareholder prima-
cy as one could find, embraced a version of stakeholder management.236 
Relying on “nonconsequentialist” ethics, the new generation of 
scholars rarely looked at the empirical record and generally avoided 
naming actual firms. And when they did, unless it was Enron, Wal-Mart, 
or another company on a very short list of acceptable villains, it was to 
praise them. As a result, Shell Oil was noted for its commitment to 
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stakeholder management, 237  despite deceiving investors regarding re-
serves, purchasing weapons for Nigerian police, or attempting to conceal 
the impact of MTBE.238 Before the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disas-
ter,239 BP was praised for its environment responsiveness.240 Also, Mi-
crosoft was invited to speak to a Society of Business Ethics Conference 
shortly before it announced that despite fifty-six billion dollars in cash 
and a near monopoly in its core product markets, it was planning to cut 
employee benefits.241 Overall, the literature of the field has been consist-
ently too polite to discuss declining wages, the buying of politicians, the 
military or prison industrial complex, state-level subsidies, union bust-
ing, and the undermining of regulation. 
VI. CONCLUSION: END OF AN ERA AND A PARADOX SOLVED  
The “rentierization”242 of the American economy continued apace 
over the last generation. Between the early 1970s and the early 2000s, 
the “FIRE” sector (finance, insurance, and real estate) of the economy 
nearly doubled its share of corporate profits from just over 20% to 
around 40%, although it counted for only a tenth of total employment, 
and that was before the housing bubble inflated.243 Furthermore, the prof-
itability of nonfinancial corporations increasingly depends on the per-
formance of these companies’ own portfolio of financial investments.244 
Meanwhile, subsidies in the form of military procurement or state-level 
development incentives have proceeded largely unabated, even in-
creased, as a share of federal and state budgets.245 The taxes of greatest 
interest to rentiers—taxes on the top income bracket, capital gains, and 
corporate profits—have been under continuous downward pressure, and 
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regulations and liability regarding financial transactions were relaxed by 
Congress and the Supreme Court in the 1990s, while enforcement agen-
cies were undermined by funding cuts and political appointments.246 
Corporate pensions have been manipulated—and even looted—not only 
to enhance firm profitability and thus raise the value of executive stock 
options but also to directly subsidize executive pensions. 247  Periodic 
campaigns to privatize social security or reduce benefits should be 
viewed as the ultimate effort of the rentier class to tap this vast store of 
wealth or employ it in the continuous reduction of their own taxes. 
In short, the paradox presented by Mizruchi and Hirschman be-
comes readily explicable. Protected by golden parachutes on the down-
side with no evident ceiling in potential earnings, it has become quite 
rational for American top management to view their primary economic 
interest as the upward redistribution of income coupled to the robustness 
of financial markets and supportive government policies or inaction. 
Given the realistic uncertainty of where the world is heading in even the 
near future, there is little to be gained by self-sacrificing these potential 
rents in favor of trying, perhaps quixotically, to bolster the long-term 
viability of one’s own organization, let alone that of the larger society. 
Even those who appear committed to the success of their own firm—
perhaps because, like Steve Jobs, as founders they are motivated by more 
than pecuniary interests—do not apparently identify their organizations 
with the great bulk of their employees, most of whom are either readily 
replaced or deftly given reduced terms of employment (more work or 
less compensation) when practical.248 Employees may even be extorted, 
possibly through the use of severance packages as in the case of such 
“hi-tech” firms as Siemens and IBM, to train their replacements.249 
Mizruchi and Hirschman are correct in claiming that from a long-
term organizational point of view, a single-payer system of health insur-
ance makes sense because it removes a genuine burden on corporations, 
or at least, it would make the cost more certain in the manner of workers 
compensation a century ago.250 From the rentier’s perspective, however, 
single-payer health insurance would be a disaster. Not only would it re-
duce the nearly guaranteed profits of the influential insurance industry 
but it would also concede the power of government to intercede in a tra-
ditionally managerial prerogative, while offering further protection to 
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employees that would reduce dependency on specific employers. In 
short, it would work against broader rentier interest in fostering a low-
regulation and high-subsidy state and a workforce with little individual 
or collective bargaining power. Old habits do not die immediately, and it 
was true that in the early eighties, when this rentierization process was 
only just underway, the business roundtable could advocate taxing its 
own members to close what they perceive as the economic threat of 
budget deficits. Having survived those deficits, however, and having be-
come more acclimated to their new role and the interests that attach to it, 
it has become almost unimaginable for the corporate elite to collectively 
offer to surrender a share of personal wealth to a government that spends 
it in ways that the individual executive regards as a waste, or worse, a 
threat to his own power. 
This too, however, will pass. Arrighi notes that the end of a hege-
monic cycles ends not with financial hypertrophy, or even the steady rise 
of a successor, such as China, but a generation of major warfare.251 Let 
us hope that this is one part of the cycle that won’t revisit. 
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